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PAINT A NEW PICTURE:
THE ARTIST-MUSEUM PARTNERSHIP ACT
AND THE OPENING OF NEW MARKETS FOR
CHARITABLE GIVING
I. INTRODUCTION

Museums1 serve as the curators of the public trust.2
Historically, the federal government has supported this role
through tax incentives for charitable donations to tax-exempt
entities. 3 Generally, the tax code fosters a symbiotic relationship
between private taxpayer donors and museums wherein the
taxpayer gains a deduction based on the free market value of the
donated object while the museum gains the benefit of the object
itself. Various incarnations of this scheme have existed over
roughly the past hundred years. For a little over half that time,
artists and collectors were on the same tax footing: the artist
creators could take a deduction equal to that of a collector of the
same objects.4 Changes to the tax code during the late 1960's,
however, removed artists from the fair market value regime.5 A
1. This article uses the term "museum" to refer to any collecting institution
that qualifies under the Artist-Museum Partnership Act. See infra note 140 and
accompanying text. This encompasses the traditional visual arts museum as
well as other educational institutions that may have an interest in collecting
other types of artistic works, such as the Library of Congress.
2. See David R. Gabor, Deaccessioning Fine Art Works: A Proposalfor
Heightened Scrutiny, 36 UCLA L. REV. 1005, 1007-08 (1989) (establishing the
basis for a theory of public ownership of museum collections). The term
"public trust" is related to the idea of the "charitable trust", a trust "created to
benefit . . . the general public rather than a private individual or entity."

(8th ed. 2004). Here, the term is used to refer to
that body of cultural material thought of as belonging to the public and
maintained by public and semi-public institutions. These institutions can be
thought of as holding these objects "in trust" for the benefit of the general
public.
3. For policy justifications for government support of charitable giving, see
Note, Tax Treatment of Artists' Charitable Contributions, 89 YALE L.J. 144,
149-52 (1979).
4. Douglas J. Bell, Note, ChangingLR.C. § 170(e)(1)(A): For Art's Sake, 37
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 536, 538-39 (1987).
5. Note, supra note 3, at 147-48.
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precipitous decline in artist giving followed.6 A similar drop in
collector giving followed additional changes to the tax code in
later years.7 Other developments in the art community have had
an impact on the treatment of art objects, including a long-running
debate on deaccession policies' and the passage of moral rights
legislation.9
The purpose of this Article is to explore a possible nexus
between these elements of the art world. That nexus takes the
form of Senate Bill 405: The Artist-Museum Partnership Act.1"
The Act would allow artists to take the same fair market tax
deduction on charitable gifts of their own art that collectors are
allowed to take, with several significant differences to be
discussed below. Part II of this Article will set out background
materials. A historical review of charitable giving in the United
States as it applies to art will supply a necessary anchor for the
overall discussion, while a discussion of the modem museum,
particularly the practice of deaccession, and moral rights will
provide the necessary context. Part III will set out a brief history
of the Act and the statutory provisions of the Act. Part IV of this
Article will feature an analysis of the Act as a nexus between
charitable giving, the institutional museum, the practice of
deaccession, and the moral rights of the artist. Part IV will
examine the effect of the Act on giving generally and the implied
mandates the Act may put on museums engaged in charitable
relationships with the artists represented in their collections.

6. Bell, supra note 4, at 548-549.
7. See, e.g. Maria J. Lozier, New Incentives to Give: Impacts of the 1990
Amendment to Section 57 on Charitable Contributionsof Appreciated Tangible
Property, 44 TAx LAW. 885, 895 (1991) (quoting statistics about the drop in

charitable giving to museums after a change in the alternative minimum tax
treatment of appreciated property).
8. See Jennifer L. White, Note, When it's Ok to Sell a Monet: A TrusteeFiduciary-Duty Framework for Analyzing the Deaccessioning of Art to Meet

Museum Operating Expenses, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1041, 1042-43 (1996).
"Deaccession" refers to the formal removal of a piece from a collection. See
infra note 77 and accompanying text.

9. The Visual Artist Rights Act of 1990. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006).
10. The Artist-Museum Partnership Act, S. 405, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
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II. BACKGROUND

This section will present a historical overview of charitable
giving as it relates to art objects. Then, it will discuss the modem
museum as an institution. It will conclude with a description of
actions culminating in the Act.
A. CharitableGiving in the United States
The United States government has a long history of supporting
charitable giving dating back to the Revenue Act of 1917." The
Revenue Act aligned the federal tax code to reflect the tradition of
the philanthropist entrepreneur of the late nineteenth century and
established a system by which private investment in the public
good supported democratic principles and a means of societal
progress.
Similar legislation in 1954 defined the charitable
deduction as we know it today by allowing individual taxpayers to
immediately deduct the fair market value of appreciable items
donated to qualified charitable organizations."3 While this regime
favored the ultra-wealthy as those most likely to have access to the
sort of goods contemplated by the deduction, 4 artists and wealthy
collectors were treated the same under the tax code. 5 An artist
could, subject to valuation of his or her work, deduct the same
amount as could a collector holding the same work at the same
time. Developments in tax theory and concerns over abuses led to

11. Susan E. Wagner, Note, The Implications of Changing the Current Law
on Charitable Deductions - Maintaining Incentives for Donating Art to

Museums, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 773, 773 (1986).
12. See Note, supra note 3, at 150-52.

See also William A. Drennan,

Charitable Donations of IntellectualProperty: The Casefor Retaining the Fair

Market Deduction, 2004 UTAH L. REv. 1045, 1054-55 (2004) ("The charitable
deduction has been praised for encouraging pluralism ... [and] grants citizens
the power to control the use of funds .... ); Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A.
Maine, Giving Intellectual Property,39 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1721, 1727 (2006)
(describing the history of philanthropy in the United States).
13. Nguyen & Maine, supra note 12, at 1744-45.
14. Samuel G. Wieczorek, Winokur Lose or Draw: Art Collectors Lose an
Important Tax Break, 8 Hous. Bus. & TAx. L.J. 90, 99 (2007).
15. Bell, supra note 4, at 538-39.
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steady changes in the system over the next fifty years. 6 The first
and, for the purposes of this Article, most important of these
changes occurred in 1969.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969"7 ("The Reform Act") was a
response to a number of concerns Congress had regarding the
charitable-deduction regime. One was the practice of politicians
reaping tax benefits from the donation of materials generated
during their tenure in office, such as when President Nixon took a
large deduction after donating his vice-presidential papers. 8 More
broadly, however, Congress was concerned that the charitable
donation system favored charitable donations of property over
sales and charitable after-tax cash donations by not treating the
appreciated value of certain kinds of tangible property as income. 19
In some circumstances, it was possible for a donor to profit more
through tax savings on charitable deductions than through selling
the object subject to the donation.2 °
Congress felt this scenario undermined the charitable motivation
for donations. 2'
The Committee Reports of both the House
Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on
Finance said of these situations that "[i]t appears that the
Government, in fact, is almost the sole contributor to the
charity."2
Both chambers argued that it was simply not the
intention of the charitable-giving regime to reward the giving of
property to such an extent as to incentivize giving property over
selling property.23
This was especially a concern when the
appreciated value of the donation was derived from the fact that
the object was the product of the donor's own labor, as would be

16. See Lozier, supra note 7, at 889-91 (discussing policy arguments in favor

of charitable giving reform generally).
17. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified as

amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
18.
19.
20.
2027,

Bell, supra note 4, at 542.
See Note, supra note 3, at 147.
SEN. REP. No. 91-552, at 72 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2109-10.

21. Id.
22. Compare Id., with H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 47 (1969), reprinted in 1969
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1700.
23. SEN. REP. No. 91-552, at 72; H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 47.
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the case with artist donations.24
Additionally, Congress was concerned that such donations were
being routinely overvalued.25 There was some disagreement as to
how to address this issue as the Tax Reform Act was being
considered.
The House Committee on Ways and Means
considered this a compelling reason to consider reforming the
charitable-deduction regime." However, the Senate Committee on
Finance favored reforming IRS auditing procedures, because it
believed that the problem of overvaluation would continue
regardless of the charitable deduction regime.27
The Reform Act sought to remedy the incentive issue and reign
in the overvaluation problem2 by changing the tax code such that
deductions taken on donations of self-created appreciable property
would be reduced by the amount by which the creator would have
benefited had he or she sold the piece on the open market.29 In
other words, under the Reform Act, the donation of art would be
treated the same as any material created for the purpose of
realizing ordinary income, that is, the deduction would be limited
to the base costs to the artist." This has remained the status quo
with regard to artist giving.
The Reform Act placed a few limitations on collectors. It
created the "related use rule" requiring that the charitable donee
use the donation to further its mission." It also placed limits on
24. H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 48.
25. Bell, supra note 4, at 542.

26. H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 48.
27. SEN. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 20, at 73.
28. In addition to changing the charitable giving rules, Congress addressed
the overvaluation issue by creating the IRS Art Advisory Panel, a group of

experts that review appraisals of charitable donations of art. Jessica L. Furey,
Paintinga Dark Picture: The Needfor Reform of IRS Practicesand Procedures
Relating to Fine Art Appraisals, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 177, 182.

Currently, any deduction for a charitable art donation in excess of $20,000 is
automatically reviewed by the Panel. Anne-Marie E. Rhodes, Big Picture Fine
Print: The Intersection ofArt and Tax, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 179, 197 (2003).
29. Bell, supra note 4, at 539.
30. Note, supra note 3, at 147-48. Essentially this means that the deduction
is limited to the physical materials the artist used in the creation of the work.
31. Bell, supra note 4, at 563-64. See also Rhodes, supra note 28, at 190-91
(describing the related use rule and advocating donee certification of related
use); Wagner, supra note 11, at 779-80 (describing the related use rule). The
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the amount by which a taxpayer may reduce his or her gross
income through the use of deductions of charitable donations.32
Deductions exceeding this amount were subject to carryover for up
to five years.33 Other limitations developed during this period.
Deductions were only available for transfers of undivided interests
in the donated object.34 Taxpayers soon found, however, that they
could donate a fraction of undivided interests in art, carry over the
excess deduction for up to five years, and then donate a further
fraction of the remaining undivided interest, again applying the
carryover provisions to the subsequent deduction.35 In this way,
taxpayers could realize deductions on a greater portion of the total
fair market value of works of art worth a significant portion of
their gross income, and in doing so, lower their gross income for
several tax cycles through the donation of a single piece.36
Additionally, each subsequent donation required that the work be
reappraised, with the subsequent deduction based on the new
appraisal.37 This strategy, known as "fractional giving," came into
widespread use after an important tax case in 1988.38
In Winokur v. Commissioner39 a taxpayer donated a percentage
of his undivided interest in a collection of paintings to a local
museum in two equal installments over two tax years, taking a
deduction in both years.4" The museum, though it had a right to
display the collection for a portion of the year corresponding to its
related use rule came out of a compromise in Conference Committee reflecting
the policy of encouraging charitable gifts. The original House version of the bill

would have eliminated the fair market deduction for all charitable donations,
including donations from collectors. CONF. REP. 91-782, at 17 (1969), reprinted
at 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2408 (1969).
32. Drennan, supra note 12, at 1062.
33. Wieczorek, supra note 14, at 93.
34. Rhodes, supra note 28, at 193.
35. Elizabeth Dillinger, Comment, A Not So Starry Night: The Pension
Protection Act's Destruction of Fractional Giving, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1045,

1051 (2008).
36. Id. at 1051-52. See also Emily J. Follas, Note, "It Belongs in a
Museum ": AppropriateDonor Incentives for FractionalGifts of Art, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1779, 1789 (2008).
37. Follas, supra note 36, at 1790.
38. Wieczorek, supra note 14, at 97.

39. Winokur v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 733 (1988).
40. Id. at 734-35.
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own undivided interest, chose not to display the paintings, and in
fact never took possession of the paintings.' The IRS challenged
the deductions, claiming that the fact that the museum did not
exercise its right to the collection suggested a non-deductible
"future interest.

'4 2

The Tax Court rejected the IRS's argument and

held that it was the right itself that controlled the status of the
donation for the purposes of the deduction.43
After Winokur, museums were free to build long term
relationships with donors in which donors would begin donations
with the understanding that whole ownership would eventually
pass to the museum, but that the donor would retain physical
control of the piece in the meantime.44 The museum realized the
long-term benefits of ownership while gaining considerable time
to plan the integration of the work into its collection, including the
financial planning necessary to facilitate the often expensive
process of taking physical ownership.45 In the meantime, the
donor was able to circumvent the percentage limits on deductions,
thus potentially deducting the full value of the work, while
maintaining the flexibility to adjust the donation and resulting
deduction to their evolving income situation and maintaining the
physical art object in their private home.46 And if the value of the
art increased, the donor gained the benefit of that increase through
the reappraisal system.47 These fractional-giving relationships
quickly became important both as an estate planning tool and as an
acquisition strategy for museums.48
These developments led Congress to add dramatic restrictions to

41. Id. at 735.

42. Id. at 736, 739.
43. Id. at 740.
44. See Dillinger, supra note 35, at 1050-5 1.
45. Wieczorek, supra note 14, at 97-98.
46. Rhodes, supra note 28, at 195. See also Wieczorek, supra note 14, at 97
("[The Winokur Method] allowed the donor to custom tailor his donations along
with fluctuations in his income.").
47. See Dillinger, supra note 35, at 1051 (posing a hypothetical example of

how a taxpayer might benefit in this way).
48. Wieczorek, supra note 14, at 97-98. See also Dillinger, supra note 35, at
1052-53 (illustrating major fractional- giving campaigns and their benefit to

museums).
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the Pension Protection Act of 2006 ("PPA"). 9 With some
perceiving fractional giving to be an unfair tax loophole, Congress
inserted tax provisions" into the Pension Protection Act of 2006.51
These provisions came about after a newspaper article highlighting
the features of fractional giving, including some extreme examples
of donations in which collectors had taken particularly large
deductions without relinquishing physical possession of the
52
donated objects, came to the attention of members of the Senate.
Unlike the Tax Reform Act, these provisions passed quickly with
little debate. 3
The PPA made several changes to the tax regime. Overruling
Winokur, the PPA requires that donee organizations take physical
possession within ten years of the initial gift or upon the donor's
death, whichever is first. 4 Further, the donor must donate his or
her entire interest in the work within that timeframe.55 The donor
must be, with certain exceptions, the sole owner of the donated
work.56 The reappraisal system has been replaced with a single
valuation at the time of the initial gift, unless the object loses
value, at which point the subsequent deduction is adjusted down to
the lower appraisal. 7 Finally, the PPA imposed a "recapture"
device.58 In the case that the donation fails any of the PPA's
requirements- for example, if the donation is not completed upon
the donor's death- regardless of the remaining value of the piece,
the donor is required to pay back the value of his or her deductions
plus ten percent."
This "premature death" hypothetical could also result in what

49. Follas, supra note 36, at 1791-93. See also Wieczorek, supra note 14, at
98-100 (discussing in detail the public debate leading up to the passage of the
PPA of 2006).
50. Wieczorek, supra note 14, at 91.
51. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified

in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. & 29 U.S.C.).
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Principally Senator Charles Grassley. Wieczorek, supra note 14, at 100.
Dillinger, supra note 35, at 1045-46.
Wieczorek, supra note 14, at 103.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 100-01.
Id, at 101.
Id at 102.
Id. at 102-03.
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has been called "the mismatch problem."6 The estate tax defines
the value of appreciable goods as the fair market value at the time
of death, while the 2006 Act defines the same goods subject to a
fractional gift as the fair market value at the time of the initial
gift. 6' If the donated work increases in value, the donor's estate
could incur a tax liability for the higher value without the
corresponding benefit of deducting the appreciated value and
despite having essentially already donated the piece.62 Thus, in
2006 what had been an important tool became a prohibitively
expensive tax liability. 63 This has remained the status quo with
regard to collector giving.
B. The Modern Museum and Deaccession
Modem museums are typically incorporated as non-profits
under I.R.C. section 501(c), 4 even though they often feature
governmental elements of both trusts and corporations.65 The
ability and tendency to incorporate as tax-exempt charitable
organizations are reflections both of the federal government's
policy of supporting the public trust and of the museum's unique
role in maintaining the public trust.6 6 Museum collections are seen
as belonging to the public, in order to enrich the public good.67
This public-private situation is embraced in tangible ways by both
the government and by the museum community.
In order to protect the public interest in a particular museum

60. Wieczorek, supra note 14, at 104.
1796.
61. Wieczorek, supra note 14, at 104.

See also Follas, supra note 36, at

62. Id. at 105.
63. See Follas, supra note 36, at 1798.
64. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (exempting educational organizations from

certain taxes).
65. Jason R. Goldstein, Note, Deaccession: Not Such a Dirty Word, 15
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 218-19, 220 (1997). See also Mary Varson
Cromer, Note, Don't Give Me That!: Tax Valuation of Gifts to Art Museums, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 777, 779 (2006).
66. See Wagner, supra note 11, at 773. See also Goldstein, supra note 65, at
214 (arguing that a museum is a public trust owing a fiduciary duty to the public
at large).
67. Gabor, supra note 2, at 1007-08.
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collection, state attorney generals are empowered to challenge the
actions of museums towards their own collections.6" Two highprofile examples of this form of government intervention occurred
in New York State during the 1970s.69 The Metropolitan Museum
of Art and the Museum of the American Indian-Heye Foundation
embarked on deaccession programs with little initial public
scrutiny. 7° The State Attorney General stepped in and reviewed

both programs, 7' framing his intervention in terms of "ensur[ing]
that 'the sales were provident, prudent and reasonable,' 72 and not
"wasteful. 73 It is notable that other institutions with publically
transparent deaccession policies tended to avoid government
intervention during this same period."4

For its part, the museum community has established best
practices through its various professional organizations that
acknowledge the special service museums provide to the public at
large. The American Association of Museums accreditation

standards require that museums identify the community they are to
serve. 7' Also, the standards require that an accredited museum
focus its mission statement on education, public service, and

68. White, supra note 8, at 1045.
69. Goldstein, supra note 65, at 220-22, 231-32. The Metropolitan Museum
of Art deaccessions occurred between 1971 and 1973. Id. at 221. The Museum
of the American Indian deaccessions occurred in 1974. Id. at 231-32. The
broader topic of deaccession is discussed infra note 88-102 and accompanying
text.
70. Id. at 220-22, 231-32. See also Gabor, supra note 2, at 1021 (These were
not the only high-profile incidents occurring in New York during this period: a
curator at the Brooklyn Museum unilaterally deaccessioned a number of pieces
under fraudulent circumstances in 1978.).
71. Goldstein, supra note 65, at 222, 231.
72. Id. at 222 (quoting 2 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN,
LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS

721 (2d ed. 1987).

73. Id. at 231 (quoting JAMES C. BAUGHMAN, TRUSTEES, TRUSTEESHIP, AND
THE PUBLIC GOOD 107 (1987)) (internal quotes omitted).

74. Id. at 233-34.
75. AM.
ASS'N
OF
MUSEUMS,
ACCREDITATION
COMMISSION'S
EXPECTATIONS REGARDING MISSION 2 (2005), available at http://www.aam-

us.org/museumresources/accred/upload/Mission%20ACE%20(2005).pdf
("A
mission statement should state what the museum does, for whom, and why.")
(emphasis added).
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accountability.76 Finally, the standards require that accredited
museums institute ethics policies that favor the public" and
collection maintenance policies that emphasize the public nature of
the museum missions. 8
The ethical culture of museums requires that they constantly
evolve to fit the needs of their mission.79 This has serious
implications for the finances of these institutions. Charitable
organizations in general have increased their financial holdings to
an unprecedented level over the last decade.8" Museums as a class
are no different. For example, in the 2008 fiscal year, the Art
Institute of Chicago held assets totaling over a billion dollars.8
Despite this trend, however, museums face difficult challenges as
they attempt to remain viable. One of these challenges is the rise
of corporate art collecting, wherein companies buy art as
76. Id.
77. AM.
EXPECTATIONS

Ass'N

OF
MUSEUMS,
ACCREDITATION
COMMISSION'S
REGARDING AN INSTITUTIONAL CODE OF ETHICS 2 (2005),

availableat http://www.aam-us.org/museumresources/accred/upload/Ethics/ 20
Code%20ACE%20(2005).pdf.
78. AM.
ASS'N
OF
MUSEUMS,
ACCREDITATION
COMMISSION'S
EXPECTATIONS REGARDING COLLECTIONS STEWARDSHIP

2 (2005), available at

http://www.aam-us.org/museumresources/accred/upload/Collections%20Stewar
dship%20ACE%20(2005).pdf.

79. See Id.; see also AM. ASS'N OF MUSEUMS,

ACCREDITATION

PLANNING 1-3
(2005), availableat http://www.aam-us.org/museumresources/accred/upload/Pl
anning%20ACE%20(2005).pdf.
80. Nguyen & Maine, supra note 12, at 1729.
81. ART INST. OF CHICAGO, REPORT OF THE TREASURER 43 (2008), available
at
http://www.artic.edu/aic/aboutus/annual-report_.2008/RptTreasurer.pdf
The form of these assets is important to the larger discussion. By far the largest
asset category is investments totaling approximately $828 million. Id. at 45.
Additionally, approximately $423 million in assets are in the form of property.
Id. In other words, while the total endowment of the Art Institute may be
staggering, it is not necessarily liquid. Indeed, cash and cash equivalents totaled
less than a million dollars in 2008, while assets attributable to "net art
acquisitions" totaled approximately $1.9 million. Id. What emerges is a picture
of a large and healthy organization with a forward looking strategy, but without
unlimited resources. In fact, the Art Institute implemented a number of costcutting measures in June of 2009, including a salary reduction for the museum
director, unpaid furloughs, and laying off three percent of its staff. Art Institute
of Chicago lays off 22 employees, Chi. Trib., June 20, 2009, at 11.
COMMISSION'S

EXPECTATIONS
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investments, 82 sometimes displaying the pieces in their offices and
claiming the purchase as a business expense. 83
Museum
acquisition budgets cannot compete in this inflated art market.84
Consequently, donations are the life-blood of museums,
accounting for approximately eighty percent of all new museum
acquisitions in the United States, and fully ninety percent of all
museum collections.8 5 A look at specific collections confirms the
importance of the donor relationship to the vitality of the museum
community. For example, the 2006 acquisitions list for the Art
Institute of Chicago features nearly two hundred gifts,86 while the
foundational collection of the Museum of Contemporary Art,
Chicago, was based entirely on gifts from Chicago's leading art
collectors of the 1950s and 1960s.87
In order for museum collections to remain relevant to their
institutional mission and to evolve under these financial
conditions, museums often engage in deaccessioning. Deaccession
is typically a formal process of removing a piece from both the
museum collection and its catalog.88 Deaccession occurs for a
number of reasons, some of which implicate more difficult ethical
problems than others. Generally, deaccession is a tool with which
museums shape their collections.89
Storing works that are
redundant or no longer have an appropriate place within the
museum's collection is expensive and burdensome on the
museum's infrastructural resources; therefore, a museum will
remove the work from its catalog, freeing up space to acquire more

82. Gabor, supra note 2, at 1009-10.
83. See Wagner, supra note 11, at 779 (outlining how this tax strategy might

work).
84. Gabor, supra note 2, at 1010.

85. Follas, supra note 36, at 1781. The most valuable of these donations
tend to be fractional gifts from wealthy donors. Id. at 1782.
86. ART INST. OF CHICAGO, ACQUISITIONS JULY 1, 2005 - JUNE 30, 2006
(2006), availableat http://www.artic.edu/aic/aboutus/annual-report_2006/Acqu
isitions.pdf.
87. ELIZABETH A.T. SMITH, LIFE DEATH LOVE HATE PLEASURE PAIN: A
SPECTRUM OF CONTEMPORARY ART AT THE MCA, CHICAGO (2005), available

at http://www.mcachicago.org/exhibitions/interviews/ldlhpp.html.
88. Ass'N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., ART MUSEUMS AND THE PRACTICE OF

DEACCESSIONING (2007), available at http://www.aamd.org/papers/.
89. See Gabor, supra note 2, at 1016-19.
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relevant and appropriate pieces.9" When a work is deaccessioned,
its fate depends on the policy of the particular institution. It may
be donated to a more appropriate institution or, in the case of
damaged works or works of low value, destroyed.9
Often,
however, the work is sold and the proceeds folded back into the
institution.92
The historical debate surrounding deaccession has tended to
focus on whether it is ever ethical for a museum to sell art.93 More
recently, the debate has shifted. A general consensus has
developed that deaccession can be done ethically, but the new
question is what can be done with the proceeds of such a sale.94
One possibility is that a museum may use the proceeds to
supplement its acquisition budget,95 often by earmarking proceeds
from a particular sale for the purchase of some other specific
object and attributing the new acquisition to the original donor.96
This practice is widely accepted as appropriate.97 Another
possibility is that a museum may use the proceeds to supplement
its endowment or its operating costs.98 This practice has generated
controversy,99 particularly in the wake of several high-profile
museum closures and budget cuts in the last year."10 Critics of this
form of deaccession claim that it is inconsistent with the ideals of
the public trust and museum's dedication to public interests.'0 '
90. See Goldstein, supra note 65, at 227.
91. See, e.g., INDIANAPOLIS MUSEUM OF ART, IMA -DEACCESSION POLICY §
I(B)(1 0) (2008), availableat http://www.imamuseum.org/sites/default/files/Fin
alIMADeaccessionpolicy.pdf.
92. Goldstein, supra note 65, at 213.
93. See, e.g., White, supra note 8, at 1042-43; Gabor, supra note 2, at 1006.
94. See Gabor, supra note 2, at 1005-06.
95. White, supra note 8, at 1043.
96. Gabor, supra note 2, at 1012.
97. Goldstein, supra note 65, at 225.
98. Gabor, supra note 2, at 1019.
99. See Goldstein, supra note 65, at 224-226.

100. One of the most significant is the Rose Museum at Brandeis University.
See Geoff Edgers & Peter Schworm, Brandeis to sell school's art collection,
Boston Globe, Jan. 26, 2009 availableat http://www.boston.com/ae/theater-arts

/articles/2009/01/26/brandeis to sell schools art collection.
101. See Gabor, supra note 2, at 1014 ("[S]ome believe museums are

inviolate cultural repositories and contend nothing should ever be removed ...
.11).
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Supporters claim that it is in the public's interest to protect
museums as the stewards of the public trust, and that in pursuing
this interest it is sometimes necessary to responsibly deaccession
some work in order to keep museums operating. 102
C. The Visual Artist Rights Act
United States intellectual property law differentiates between
copyright protections, rights to the physical object being
copyrighted," 3 and moral rights vested in the author of the
copyrighted object by virtue of being the author.'04 For example, it
is possible to alienate the copyright to a work of art without
alienating the work itself;,0 5 therefore, in order to claim a
deduction on a charitable donation, a collector must donate his or
her entire interest in the work, that is, both physical ownership and
copyright control.'0 6 Moral rights are different in this respect.
Moral rights vest only in the author of a work and typically cannot
be alienated. 107
The moral rights regime has been more strongly associated with
the European civil law tradition than with the common law
tradition in general or in the United States in particular.0 8 Moral
rights were originally excluded from copyright legislation in the
United States, as well as from the common law tradition generally,
in favor of tort0 9 and contract"0 regimes that protected an artist's
102. See White, supra note 8, at 1065.
103. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006) ("Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the
exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material
object in which the work is embodied.").
104. Id. § 106A(b).
105. Id. § 202.
106. 26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(3)(A) (2006). See also Rhodes, supra note 28, at
193.
107. Cyrill P. Rigamonti, DeconstructingMoral Rights, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J.
353, 355 (2006). Conceptually, there is debate as to the extent to which these
inalienable rights may be waived. Compare id. at 376-77 (the civil law

tradition, represented by France and Germany, seems to suggest limited waiver),
with 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (in the United States, waiver is only limited to the
requirement of a written instrument).
108. See Rigamonti, supra note 107, at 353-54.
109. See id. at 382-87.
110. See id. at 387-92.
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interests after the transfer of other rights. This changed somewhat
with the passage of the Visual Artist Rights Act ("VARA") in
1990.
VARA established statutory rights of integrity and attribution
for authors of certain works. "' Authors of works of visual art,
defined as "a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a
single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are
signed and consecutively numbered by the author

.

.

[or] a still

12
photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only," 1
have a right to have their name associated with their work, to not
have their name associated with work they did not produce, and to
remove their name from work that has been modified in a way
"prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation."'' 3 Additionally,
authors of visual art works have the right "to prevent any
intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.
.and to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature..

.,,...
These rights cannot be transferred, can only be waived by a

written instrument, and remain in effect for the life of the artist.'
VARA also contains exceptions for modifications "resulting from
the passage of time or the inherent nature of the materials
conservation, or the public presentation" of the work." 6
Courts have read VARA narrowly and have imposed limits on
its grant of rights. Potential conflicts with other laws have led
courts to view VARA's limited protections as enumerated, thus
limiting moral rights protection to works falling within VARA's
rubric. 1 Additionally, works of "recognized stature" have been
defined by the standards of the art community,"' meaning that the
full range of VARA's protections only apply to major works and
major living artists. Finally, courts have interpreted VARA to
exclude "site-specific" works,' utilitarian works,' 20 advertising,' 2
111. Id., at 405.

112. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
113. Id. § 106A(a)(1)-(2).
114. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(A)-(B).
115. Id. § 106A(d)(1), (e)(1).

116. Id. § 106A(c)(1)-(2).
117. Rigamonti, supra note 107, at 410-11.

118. Scott v. Dixon, 309 F. Supp. 2d 395, 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
119. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 143 (1st Cir.
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or uncompleted works.122 While VARA's protections have been in
place for almost twenty years, much of the case law has revolved
around private disputes,'23 public works,' 4 and museum
commissions,'25 rather than complex fact patterns involving
donations.
III. THE CURRENT PROPOSED LEGISLATION

In terms of artist giving, the inequitable tax standing compared
to collectors has endured despite repeated attempts to rectify the
situation created by the Tax Reform Act.'26 The Artist-Museum
Partnership Act was introduced in the Senate during each of the
last five Congressional sessions, and it has been passed as
amendments in three Senate bills.'27 None of these bills were
enacted with the Act in place. 28
'
The most recent version of the Act was introduced to the 111 th
Congress as Senate Bill 405 on February 10th, 2009, by Senator
Patrick Leahy. 29 In his introductory remarks, Senator Leahy
commented on the current "disincentive for artists to donate their
works to museums and libraries," framing the purpose of the Act
in terms of "keep[ing] cherished art works in the United States and
• . . preserv[ing] them in our public institutions."'3 ° He then
discussed the discrepancy between tax treatment of artists and that
of collectors. "' The Senator recalled the appraisal scandals that
led to the original changes in the tax code and pointed to "new
2006).
120. Hunter v. Squirrel Hill Assocs., Inc., 413 F. Supp. 2d 517, 519 (E.D.
Penn. 2005).

121. Id.
122. Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art v. Bfichel, 565 F. Supp. 2d 245,

260 (D. Mass. 2008).
123. E.g. Scott, 309 F. Supp. 2d 395.
124. E.g. Phillips, 459 F.3d 128.
125. E.g. Biichel, 565 F. Supp. 2d 245.
126. See, e.g. Bell, supra note 4, at 562-63 (discussing the National Heritage
Resources Act of 1986).
127. 155 Cong.Rec. 2081 (2009) (Statement of Senator Leahy).
128. See id.
129. Id. at 2080-81.
130. Id. at 2081.
131. Id.
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rules" such as "providing relevant information as to the value of
the gift, providing appraisals by qualified appraisers, and, in some
cases, subjecting them to review by the Internal Revenue Service's
Art Advisory Panel," that make these concerns redundant and
outdated. 3 2 Senator Bob Bennett, co-sponsor of the Act, made his
own opening remarks in which he reiterated the need to reform the
tax discrepancy. 133
The bill itself amends §170(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 by creating paragraph (8).'
Subsection (A) of the new
paragraph institutes the "qualified artistic contribution" and sets
the amount of that contribution as "the fair market value of the
property contributed (determined at the time of such
contribution)."' 35 Subsection (A) also makes it clear that the
contribution will not be reduced under § 170(e)(1), involving long

term capital gains. 136
Subsection (B) of the new paragraph defines "qualified artistic
contribution" as a charitable donation "of any literary, musical,
artistic, or scholarly composition, or similar property, or the
copyright thereon (or both);"' 13 7 however, it goes on to limit the
contribution in several significant ways. The work must have been
created by the artist "no less than 18 months prior to [the]
contribution."' 38 The work must undergo a qualified appraisal, a
copy of which must be included in the artist's income tax return
for the year of the donation.'39 The donee must qualify as a
charitable organization under § 170(b)(1)(A). 4 ' The donation is
subject to the "related use rule" governed by the donee's 501(c)(3)
status, and the intent of the donee to put the work to a "related use"
must be certified in writing. "' Finally, the qualified appraisal
must take into account the artist's market performance by
documenting the extent to which his or her previous work has been
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
155 Cong.Rec. 2082 (2009) (Statement of Senator Bennett).
Artist Museum Partnership Act, S. 405, 111 th Cong. § 2(a) (2009).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
S. 405, 111 th Cong. § 2(a) (2009).
Id.
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"owned, maintained, and displayed by" qualified organizations and
the extent to which his or her previous work has been "sold to or
exchanged by persons other than the taxpayer, donee, or any
related person."' 42
Subsections (C) and (D) of the new paragraph work in concert to
limit the total amount of an artist's deduction. Subsection (C) sets
the maximum deduction available under the act as no more than
the artist's "artistic adjusted gross income" for the tax year, with
no carryover.'43 Subsection (D) defines "artistic adjusted gross
income" as that part of the artists adjusted gross income from "the
sale or use of property created by the personal efforts of the
taxpayer which is of the same type as the donated property, and..
from teaching, lecturing, performing, or similar activity with
respect to property" similar to the donated property.'44
Subsection (E) of the new paragraph excludes work-for-hire
pieces,' 45 while subsection (F) makes clear that the object and the
copyright to the object are generally separate properties and
specifically separate properties for the purposes of the "partial
interest rule." 1
46

IV. ANALYSIS
This section will attempt to explore the implications of the Act
on some of the issues the art community is currently faced with
under the status quo. It discusses the effects of the Act from the
two sides of the charitable equation separately. First, it discusses
the effect on the artist making the hypothetical donation. Second,
it discusses the effect on the collecting institution accepting the
donation. Finally, it concludes with practical suggestions through
which both parties can realize benefit.
A. Effect on the Artist
The Act has major implications for artists and their relationships
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.

146. S. 405, 11 1th Cong. § 2(a) (2009).
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with museums. Though the Act obviously intends to change the
incentives for charitable giving, many of these implications stem
from the unintended consequences of those incentives and the
dynamics of the new charitable-giving regime those incentives
create.
1. Unintended Consequences
The charitable-giving regime functions on the principle of
economically incentivizing or discouraging particular behaviors on
the part of taxpayers.'47 When Congress decided to throw its
support behind philanthropic endeavors in 1917, it did so by
creating an economic benefit derived from charitable donations,
thus incentivizing charitable giving.'48 Occasionally, changes in
the tax code resulted in unintended incentives, such as when the
development of fractional giving fostered what Congress thought
of as unfair tax practices. "' When Congress has perceived these
developments as supporting perverse incentives, it has responded
by removing the incentives rather than dealing directly with the
offending action. 5 ' Taxpayers, often at the advice of estate
planners, have tended to respond to these changing incentive
structures by altering their economic behavior. For example, the
passage of the PPA resulted in a drastic reduction in charitable
donations from collectors. ''
147. See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 12, at

1745 ("By granting an

immediate deduction equal to the fair market value of donated property, the

charitable deduction provided an important economic incentive for patentees,
authors, and artists to donate their patents and creative works to further
charitable organizations' activities.").
148. Drennan, supra note 12, at 1054-55.
149. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
150. For example, when Congress came to view fractional giving as a
loophole rather than a legitimate estate planning tool, it changed the eligibility

requirements of the charitable deduction to deincentivize the aspects of the
strategy it found offensive, rather than eliminating the strategy altogether or
directly legislating a more appropriate form. Dillinger, supra note 35, at 106263 (describing the terms of the PPA).
151. See Follas, supra note 36, at 1798-1800. (The effect of the PPA on
fractional giving was immediate, with some museums losing major donors,
including donors already committed to contributions, and one institution, the

San Francisco Museum of Modem Art, losing as much as eighty percent of its
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This cycle of the creation of unintended incentives, Congress's
response to those incentives, and the taxpayers' adaptation to that
response lead to further perverse incentives and dramatic
consequences. Historically, this was the case with the Tax Reform
Act. Congress passed the 1969 Tax Reform Act to counteract
what it considered bad incentives.' 52 These bad incentives were
eliminated by treating an artist's work as ordinary income property
subject to a deduction equal to the artist's adjusted basis in the
physical object.'53 However, the adjusted basis for a work of
visual art is the cost of materials.'54 For example, a painter would
be able to deduct the cost of paint and canvas, where a collector
could deduct the fair market value of the piece. Thus, after 1969,
the incentives for artists shifted away from donating their work
and toward selling their work on the private market.'55
With the passage of the Tax Reform Act, artists as a taxpayer
category responded immediately. The New York Metropolitan
Museum of Art serves as an example. In the three years after the
passage of the 1969 Act, the Met accepted donations from 15
artists totaling 28 works of art.'56 By contrast, the three year
period before the passage of the 1969 act saw 321 pieces from 97
artists. 157 Drops in artist gifts were not limited to the visual arts.
As Senator Leahy mentioned in his introductory remarks,
composer Igor Stravinsky cancelled the planned donation of his
manuscripts to the Library of Congress after the Tax Reform Act
passed and instead sold his works to a private foundation."'
Indeed, the Library experienced a huge drop in artist donations
immediately after the Tax Reform Act.' 59 According to testimony
during a Senate hearing in 1981, the Library's Music division
accepted 1,200 original works by living composers in the 7 years
leading up the Tax Reform Act. 6 0 In those 11 years after the Tax
donations in a single year.).
152. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
153. Bell, supra note 4, at 539.
154. Id.
155. Note, supra note 3, at 147.
156. Bell, supra note 4, at 548.
157. Id.
158. 155 Cong.Rec. 2081 (2009) (Statement of Senator Leahy).
159. Bell, supra note 4, at n 80.
160. Additional Estate and Gift Tax Issues: Hearings Before
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Reform Act went into effect, however, the Music Division
accepted a total of 30 original works.'61 The situation was even
starker in the Manuscript Division, where in the same period the
Library went from accepting about 200,000 artist donations a year
before the Tax Reform Act to accepting a single major gift after
the Tax Reform Act. 162 Since the Tax Reform Act there has been
no widespread donation by living artists of their own work, a
scenario attributable to the disadvantageous tax situation. 163
In light of this, it is foreseeable that the Artist Museum
Partnership Act ("the Act") would be successful in increasing the
volume of artist donations to collecting institutions. Artists would
likely chase the tax incentives on the advice of their tax advisors.
By incentivizing artist giving, the Act would increase the number
of cultural works made available to the public trust, successfully
fulfilling one of the Act's stated goals.'64 However, the incentives
in the Act reach beyond this goal. Understanding the full impact
of the legislation requires examining the patterns of behavior the
new incentives might foster.
2. The New Incentive Regime
As a first consideration, not every artist would benefit from the
new Act. Under the Act, the fair market value of any donation is
determined by a qualified appraisal.'65 Appraisals are notoriously
difficult to evaluate and are largely unregulated by the
government. 6' 6 However, the Act provides some guidance. Under
Subcommitte on Estate and Gift Taxation, Senate Committee on Finance, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 316 (1981) (testimony of Daniel J. Boorstin, Librarian of
Congress).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Bell, supra note 4, at 548. See also Note, supra note 3, at 148.
164. See 155 Cong.Rec. 2081 (2009) (Statement of Senator Leahy).
165. S. 405, 111 th Cong. § 2(a) (2009).
166. Congress has refrained from clearly defining the term "qualified
appraiser". Furey, supra note 28, at 193. There are professional groups that
maintain private standards within the industry, but there is no government
sanctioned licensure. Id. at 185-87. The few existing regulations are aimed at
eliminating conflicts of interest. Thus, the most important qualities of a
qualified appraisal are that the appraiser is not otherwise associated with the
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the Act, appraisals must take into account, among other factors, the
artist's previous market performance in the form of sales and prior
demand from collecting institutions."'l Furthermore, the resulting

deduction is not applied to the artist's total income, but rather to
the artist's income generated by his or her art.'68 Importantly, this
includes income generated from teaching or lecturing about art, as
long as the specific subject being taught is related to the type of
work the artist hopes to donate. 69
'
This suggests that the Act would significantly benefit a limited
group of taxpayers within the artistic community. The avid
hobbyist, craftsman, or local artist' who might want to take
advantage of the new incentives would face several obstacles,
including an expensive appraisal, a small market presence, and an
attenuated adjusted income. An artist would have to mitigate one
or more of these obstacles in order to significantly benefit from the
Act. Two subsets of artists immediately come to mind. Elite
living artists creating major museum pieces would have high
market demand and high appraisal valuations. Academic artists,
that is, artists who supplement or support their artistic work with
teaching, would have relatively high adjusted artistic gross
other parties and that the appraiser does not otherwise stand to gain from the
result of the appraisal. Id. at 191. Consequently, appraisals can be difficult and
expensive to obtain.
167. S. 405, 11 1th Cong. § 2(a) (2009).
168. Id.
169. Id. Thus, a painter could deduct the fair market value of a donated
painting from income generated by teaching painterly technique. The further
the teaching subject got from the donated work, the less likely the deduction
would be available. The hypothetical painter could probably take the same
deduction from income generated by teaching more academic art theory or
history classes about painting. It is an open question whether the same could be
said for art history survey courses with a more general focus, or classes about
photography or sculpture. The deduction would certainly not apply to income
the hypothetical painter generated from teaching some other, non-visual art form
such as literature or music. Note, however, that the Bill does not limit itself to
visual arts: the composer teaching musical composition would likely qualify for
a fair market deduction on the donation of his or her manuscripts.
170. This list is meant to invoke artists such as the plaintiff in Scott v. Dixon,
who "made her living as a professional artist and sculptor" and had even
"achieved some level of local notoriety," but was lacking in renown. 309 F.
Supp. 2d 395, 396, 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
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incomes on which to apply the deduction.' 7 ' For these artists,
prudent tax and estate planning would require that the artist in
question consider the tax implications of donating, rather than
selling, their work under the proposed rules.
A second consideration is the forms of giving that the Act
specifically incentivizes. Generally, an art object and the rights
attached to that object through copyright law are separately
alienable. ' As has been discussed, the current rules require that
donors transfer their entire interest in a work, including physical
ownership and copyright ownership, in order to receive a
deduction.'73 The Act brings the charitable-giving regime as it
relates to artist giving in line with the general principles of
copyright law by defining a qualified donation as an object, the
copyright to an object, or both.'74 This suggests that the object and
the copyright are distinct properties eligible for distinct deductions.
There is nothing in the plain language of the Act to disallow
separate donations of these aspects of a work of art. Thus, the Act
incentivizes multiple gifts of the same work, in a sense creating a
new type of fractional giving.
3. Hypotheticals: the Novelist and the Painter
Literary academia provides perhaps the most dramatic example
of this effect. " 5 Suppose a hypothetical novelist gained acclaim
early in her career upon the publication of her first book, for which
she was able to retain the copyright. Now she earns a comfortable
living teaching creative writing at a university. Her publisher has
recently released a new edition of the book to mark its fortieth
anniversary. As part of the marketing campaign, the novelist has
171. Elite and academic artists often overlap, especially in the literary arts.
For example, J. M. Coetzee, recipient of the 2003 Nobel Prize in literature, has

taught at a number of universities, including Harvard University and the
University of Chicago. LES PRIx NOBEL: THE NOBEL PRIZES 2003 (Tore
Fringsmyr ed., 2004), availableat http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/literature/
laureates/2003/coetzee-bio.html.
172. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006).
173. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
174. Artist Museum Partnership Act, S. 405, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009).
Collectors would still be required to transfer entire interests in a donated object.
175. Though one can imagine analogous scenarios in other art forms as well.
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made a high-profile donation of the original galley proofs of the
book to the Library of Congress, ensuring that future academics
studying her work will have access to these important indications
76
of her intended words. 1

The new edition has sold well, resulting in significant royalties
for the novelist. Under the proposed rules, the novelist could
offset some of the tax implications of this windfall by deducting
the fair market value of her donation to the Library of Congress
from her adjusted artistic gross income, which would include her
teaching salary and, presumably, the royalties. Depending on the
appraisal value of the galley proofs, which under the proposed
rules would be influenced by the market success of the novelist,
this could result in significant tax savings.
So far in this
hypothetical, the new rules have achieved their goal in that
financial incentives have pushed an important cultural object into
the public trust. 177 However, because she donated the galley
proofs and not the copyright to the work, she is still free to benefit
from the copyright. Additionally, there may be other collectable,
appreciable property attached to that creation, such as working
drafts, from which the novelist and her estate can later extract
value.
While this ability to claim a deduction based on a creation and
still profit from the creation is itself anomalous, 178 where the
proposed incentives dramatically break from the status quo is in
the ability to make actual multiple donations. Recall that
traditional fractional giving takes the form of gifts of undivided
176. Galleys are a printing of the final draft of a book before it gets printed
en masse. They are used in the proofreading process to make any last minute
corrections and to allow the author to approve the version of a book that gets
released to the public.
See e.g., Matthew Creasley, Manuscripts and
Misquotations: Ulysses and Genetic Criticism, 2007 JOYCE STUD. ANN. 44
(2007) (discussing generally the importance of proofs in literary criticism and
analyzing James Joyce's Ulysses based on changes between the various proof
editions).
177. See 155 Cong.Rec. 2081 (2009) (Statement of Senator Leahy).
178. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. This is anomalous in that,
under the status quo, donors must relinquish all interests in the donated object.

The classic illustration is the film collector who makes a donation of historical
films: she cannot retain a right to reproduce and sell the films and still take the
charitable deduction. Wieczorek, supra note 14, at 95.
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interests in the donated work. 79
' Subsequent donations of the work
represent further portions of undivided interests in the creation.
The work itself is not donated twice; rather, rights to possession of
the work are donated piecemeal. In the above hypothetical,
however, the novelist's initial donation takes an entirely different
form. The novelist has donated complete control of a physical
manifestation of the work while retaining control of the copyright,
thus alienating an individual aspect of the work and dividing her
possessory interests in the creation as a whole.
Furthermore, the copyright itself would be eligible for the
proposed charitable donation with no special limitations. "8
Suppose the novelist has come to the end of her academic career
and has begun to put her estate in order. Even under the pre-1969
rules she would have been forced to donate the copyright to the
Library of Congress along with the galley proofs in order to
receive a fair market deduction.'' Under the proposed rules, she
might decide to donate the copyright to the university that has
supported her and at which she has taught for decades so that the
university may benefit from publishing critical editions of the
work. She could then take a deduction of the fair market value of
the copyright from her adjusted artistic gross income. In other
words, she has donated the same creation two different times to
two different institutions, while benefiting from her possessory
interests in the work during the interim. Additionally, the novelist
could do the same with any of the other previously mentioned
appreciable objects associated with the creation.
The novelist hypothetical is dramatic because of this potential
for proliferated donations; however, the incentive for making
multiple donations of the same object is not limited to literature or
to complex fact patterns. Visual artists will also have incentives to
divide the possessory interests of their work under the proposed
rules. A painter, for example, could donate a painting to an art
museum, take the fair market value deduction from her adjusted
artistic gross income, and retain the copyright to the image. She
could then benefit from the copyright by licensing the image to a
179.
donor's
180.
181.

Supra note 35 and accompanying text. (A fractional gift is a gift of the
complete interest in some percentage of the piece.).
See S. 405, 11 1th Cong. § 2(a) (2009).
See Rhodes, supra note 28, at 193.
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commercial entity182 and then donating the copyright to the
museum when the license agreement expired. 83
Artist donors would likely structure such donations to achieve
the goal of traditional fractional gifts, that is, to benefit of the long
term and changing needs of the artist's estate.' 84 Just as a collector
might donate greater or lesser portions of work in a traditional
fractional gift depending on changes to his or her income, the
hypothetical novelist might time the donation of various
possessory interests associated with her book to various career
events. Having used the deduction from the donation of the galley
proofs to offset earnings from the anniversary edition, she could
then use a deduction from the donation of an early working draft to
help fund a sabbatical, or she could time the donation of the
copyright with the advance on a deal to publish her memoirs. The
hypothetical painter, meanwhile, might strategically manage her
license agreement to maximize the benefit of her deductions by
carefully choosing the period of the agreement and by structuring
payments so that she earns the most income from the agreement in
the years of the donations.
4. Impact
From the artist's point of view, the proposed rules may seem to
strike a perfect balance. The Act purports to right an inequity that
dates back to the Tax Reform Act of 1969.85 Under the proposed
rules, artists would have the potential to take advantage of
significant tax benefits from the charitable-giving regime for the
first time in recent memory. The Act would push the cultural
contributions of artists into the public trust 8 6 and give artists a tool
with which to facilitate building relationships with museums. The
Act would serve as a repudiation of the concerns over charitable
182. Commercial image agencies are increasingly important players in the
world of visual arts. See Guy Pessach, Museums, Digitization and Copyright
Law: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 1 J. INT'L MEDIA & ENT. L. 253, 262-63
(2007).
183. This has the added benefit of a convenient appraisal yardstick: the value
of the license agreement.
184. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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motivation that gave rise to the Tax Reform Act and a recognition
that the valuation concerns espoused in that act and in other
forums has been effectively dealt with. 187
The reality of the situation may be more complicated. For one
thing, as has been discussed, the Act is limited in terms of who
will substantially benefit.'8 8 Many artists would either not benefit
at all because they would not have ready access to appraisals or
would benefit nominally because of low appraisals and low "gross
artistic incomes."' 8 9 Elite artists and academic artists, in contrast,
could derive huge benefits from the proposed rules. 9 '
The
discrepancy in benefits between ordinary artists and elite artists,
and the ability of elite artists to eliminate large portions of their tax
burden through deductions, begins to resemble the so-called tax
loopholes that led to the Tax Reform Act and the PPA in the first
place risks the same sort of backlash.
Additionally, there are costs to these benefits. First, the Act puts
artists and museums in a posture of negotiation. By opening the
possibility of charitable donations, the Act increases the level of
sophistication artists will have to obtain in order to protect their
interests. Artists would have to educate themselves on this new
charitable-giving market and would have to structure donations
accordingly. The hypothetical painter illustrates the potential
transaction costs associated with this level of sophistication.19
The painter might be accustomed to dealing with museums, and
may even be accustomed to dealing with entities such as digital
image galleries, but that does not mean that the artist has the
necessary legal and business skill sets to manage the interrelated
contractual relationships that make up the sophisticated transaction
represented in the hypothetical. For that, the painter needs a
business manager, a lawyer, or both.
Finally, while this Article focuses on artists and museums, there
will still be those willing to collect works of art even after the fall
of fractional giving. The proposed incentive structure is likely to
dramatically increase artist giving. However, for any particular
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 170.
See supra text accompanying notes 170-71.
See supra note 182-83 and accompanying text.
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work artists will ultimately have a choice whether to donate or to
sell. Their choice is likely to involve the impact of market forces
on collectors who can no longer count on art collecting as an
investment vehicle.
B. Effect on Museums
The Act contains no new provisions specifically aimed at
collecting institutions.'92 However, charitable giving is a bilateral
activity: donors cannot take a deduction unless a qualified
organization takes possession of the donation.'93 Consequently,
enactment of the Act would likely have implications for museums
stemming from a need to adapt to the changed circumstances of
the charitable donation regime. The passage of VARA and the rise
of deaccession as a major issue in the museum community
complicate this adaptation.
1. Changed Circumstances
The driving forces of change facing museums under the
proposed rules would likely be the novelty of artistic giving and
the diminution of other development streams. Museums have not
been in a position to develop philanthropic relationships with
artists since the passage of the Tax Reform Act. ' Fractional
giving is on the decline. "' Passage of the Act would open up
previously closed avenues of development.' 96 Thus, from the point
of view of museums, the primary effect of the Act would be to
create a major new philanthropic market just as the current
dominant form of giving, fractional gifts, has slowed dramatically.
With fewer charitable donations coming in, many museums could

192. S. 405, 111 th Cong. § 2(a) (2009).
193. Under the PPA, that possession must be actual and physical.
Wieczorek, supra note 14, at 103.
194. See supra Part IV.A.i.
195. See supra note 143.
196. Though, because the Bill does more than restore the pre-1969 rules,
these avenues are not identical to the ones foreclosed by the 1969 Act. As will
be shown, this is an important point because it impacts how museums will
manage their developmental strategies.
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be forced into this new market. 97
As museums enter into relationships with artist donors, they may
find that their interests and the interests of the artists are not
completely aligned. Museums will have to take into account the
incentives the Act provides artists and the gifting behaviors those
incentives actually encourage. For example, fractional gifts have
been successful largely because museums have encouraged
them."98 The new style of fractional gift suggested above does not
have the same benefits for museums as the traditional style. Under
the proposed rules, museums will have to be able and willing to
take possession of the donation right away, and as a practical
matter may have to settle for less than complete ownership over
the creation.' 99 Museums would have to be proactive about
protecting their own interests in this situation, perhaps by
advocating for agreements that would limit the artist's discretion in
alienating other possessory interests in the work. For instance, the
donee museum in the painter hypothetical might insist that the
painter make a binding commitment to follow through with
donating the copyright at the end of the licensing agreement. In
this way, the museum would have some assurances that its
investment in taking physical control of the work would eventually
be rewarded with complete ownership interests in the piece.
It is unclear, however, what level of bargaining power a museum
197. This analysis would not apply to all museums.

Some collections are

more amenable to the work of living artists than others, and some institutions
are large enough to have what amounts to multiple collections. For example,
the Art Institute of Chicago's new Modem Wing houses a contemporary art
collection that features work by living artists, but also a European Modernist
collection featuring work dating as far back as the beginning of the last century.
Both are separate from the Art Institute's other collections, including
Renaissance
era
and
Impressionist
pieces.
See
http://www.artic.edu/aic/collections/exhibitions/modemwing/overview
(follow
"Collections" hyperlink). Obviously, the Art Institute would continue to
cultivate its existing philanthropic relationships with collectors in order to
develop these older collections. Under the proposed rules, however, it would
likely have to form similar relationships with artists in order to develop its

contemporary collection.
198. See Dillinger, supra note 35, at 1068 ("In the past, some museums
actively encouraged donors to use fractional giving as a way to donate, even
promoting it on their websites.").
199. See supra note 172-74 and accompanying text.
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would have in this hypothetical. Because the proposed rules deincentivize artists selling their work to collectors in favor of
donating their work to museums, potentially driving contemporary
works away from private ownership,"' accepting donations from
artists may be the only way for museums to develop collections of
contemporary art. This would seem to create demand for artist
donations, giving the artist an advantage in any such negotiations.
It may be that the prestige of being part of a particular collection is
the only bargaining chip the museum has to retain both the
donation and the control over the donation necessary to safeguard
its interests. Recall that part of the appraisal process under the
proposed rules would take into account the extent to which the
artist's work has been collected by institutions similar to the
proposed donee. A museum may be able to offer future added
value to the artist's work in exchange for the artist promising to
continue the philanthropic relationship with further gifts related to
the donation.2"'
2. VARA and the New Moral Rights Regime
Museums may in fact find themselves forced to actively protect
artists' interests in order to secure donations. One aspect of the
novelty of artist donations is that while museums have been
subject to the provisions of VARA in the context of caring for and
displaying art work since VARA's enactment in 1990, moral rights
have not been a factor in charitable donations per se because
collectors, the dominate donors under the status quo, are not

200. See Note, supra note 3, at 147.
201. Again, the literary world provides the most dramatic example. In the

novelist hypothetical, the university might argue that it would be more efficient
and ultimately add more value to the novelist's donations if she were to donate
her galley proofs to the university instead of to the Library of Congress. The
university would be offering the prestige of associating the first donation with
its name, which includes the stable of well regarded academics that manage and
study its collections, in exchange for a promise that the future donation of the
copyright will also go to the university. The novelist would then be faced with
the choice of either her original plan to split the donation between the Library of
Congress and the university, or the possibility of adding value to the second

donation.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol20/iss1/5

30

Conley: Paint a New Picture: The Artist-Museum Partnership Act and the Op

2009]

ARTIST-MUSEUM PARTNERSHIP ACT

afforded those rights. 2 There is reason to suspect that, if the Act
were to pass, moral rights would become an issue in negotiations
of charitable transactions and would become an element in the
philanthropic relationships between museums and artists. Recall
that VARA protects only a limited class of works and artists, and
that it has been read as the exclusive moral rights remedy. In the
case of the hypothetical painter, the level of protection the law
affords to his work after a donation would depend on factual
questions, such as his status and the specific work's status in the
art community, and possibly including questions of the work's
completeness and its purpose. Many of these questions are
unlikely to be determined beforehand and would be subject to
litigation in the case of a future dispute.
In Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art v. Biichel, for
example, the installation in question was not afforded any
protection because it was an unfinished work.0 3 In that case there
was some semblance of a plan for the piece, and the level of
completeness was not at issue. 0 4 Depending on the methodology
of the particular artist, 25 however, completeness will generally be
an open question. The same can be said of other elements of a
VARA claim. An artist's stature is not dispositive of a work of
202. See supra notes 107, 111 and accompanying text.
203. Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art v. Btichel, 565 F. Supp. 2d 245,
259-60 (D. Mass. 2008).
204. See id. at 246, 259.
205. Biichel illustrates this point.
In Buchel, the installation was a
collaboration between Bichel, a well established artist, and the Massachusetts
Museum of Contemporary Art. Id. at 251. The large piece was to be installed at
the Museum's expense and at Bichel's direction. Id. at 250. Biichel, however,

was not present on site for most of the process and issued his directions by email. Id. at 251. The directions were exceedingly vague and the Museum staff
ultimately made many of the specific artistic choices. Id. at 250. Had the
parties not established an overall conceptual plan that included some idea of
what the finished product would look like, this kind of collaboration could
conceivably have no end. Completion would be determined by a subjective

decision of one or both of the parties. Another example is the artist who
continuously revises or expands individual works over a long period of time, or
whose work conceptually requires that a piece go through changes over a period

of time. In a sense, these works are never complete, and whether courts would
recognize a distinction between the aborted project in Biichel and works such as
this is unclear.
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art's stature, and even elite artists could produce work that does
not fall under the VARA framework." 6 Consequently, any
number of factual determinations could be in play in any particular
case.
If these determinations do not trigger the full protection of
VARA, the law will offer only limited protection to the physical
integrity of the donation and to his right of attribution. If the
painter is a prudent donor and values his moral rights, he will seek
to enforce those rights through a contractual agreement with the
museum at the time of the donation. Such a development would
generally push VARA's provisions out of the case law, which has
tended to favor defendant institutions, and into contract law, where
contract terms mirroring VARA protections could impose
affirmative obligations on museums. To some extent this would
bring moral rights back to the broader pre-VARA paradigm of
contractual protection. There has been some movement in that
direction even under the status quo, as there has been some
indication that courts prefer contractual solutions to moral rights
conflicts over VARA claims." 7 In fact, some commentators
believe that VARA, in enumerating limited moral rights, has
actually decreased moral rights protections, thus encouraging
contract style bargaining for moral rights.0 8 In that case, the trend
toward a moral rights regime implemented by affirmative
contractual obligations would only accelerate as more artists enter
the new artist giving market.
To be clear, these obligations would for the most part be nothing
new to museums. As a matter of ethics and to the extent that
museums are already subject to VARA, many of the terms that
would come out of negotiations with proactively minded artist
donors are already incorporated into museum best practices." 9
What has changed in this hypothetical paradigm is that the
opportunity to negotiate additional terms, the ability to enforce
liability under those terms, and the need for the parties involved to
206. See Scott v. Dixon, 309 F. Supp. 2d 395, 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
207. See Rigamonti, supra note 107, at 410.
208. See, e.g., Rigamonti, supra note 107, at 411.
209. See e.g., AM. ASS'N OF MUSEUMS, AAM STANDARDS REGARDING
FACILITIES AND RISK MANAGEMENT (2007), available at http://www.aam-

us.org/aboutmuseums/standards/upload/frmstandards.pdf.
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protect their own interests, could give rise to an increase in
restricted giving.2"'
3. Restricted Giving and the Criteriafor Deaccession
Even under the status quo collectors often make charitable
donations on a restricted basis."' Typical restrictions involve
assuring that the work is available for public viewing or restricting
the circumstances under which the work may be sold.2"2 Museums
tend to be conflicted about this method of donation because the
restrictions have the potential to be overly burdensome." 3 In an
environment in which the interests of artists and museums are
competing and in which artists contract to protect their moral
rights, museums may have to accept an increase in restricted
giving as part of the price of entering the new artist donation
market. Having already entered into a posture of negotiation,
artists may elect to advocate for specific terms related to their
moral rights that have the effect of restrictions. For example, these
terms might insist on certain conditions for the storage or upkeep
of the work, imposing specific requirements beyond a mere recital
of the moral right of integrity and implicating potentially
significant infrastructure costs in the form of space and climate
controls. These moral rights terms might be, in addition to the
typical restrictions, already common in the museum community.
For an example of what this might look like, consider a possible
agreement between the hypothetical painter and a museum. The
painter agrees to donate a painting to the museum, but retains the
copyright for a period of five years, during which time the painter
will license the painting to a commercial image gallery. In
exchange for donating the copyright to the museum at the end of
the license agreement, the museum enters into a contractual

210. Put another way, both the artist and the museum will be actively

involved in the process of agreeing to the terms of a charitable donation, and, as
suggested above, each party may not have the same goals. This situation leads
to concessions on both sides as the parties work to an agreement that benefits

both.
211. See Cromer, supra note 65, at 780.

212. See id. at 789.
213. See id. at 802-04.
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agreement with the painter that affirms the painter's moral rights
as embodied in VARA, strengthens those rights by specifying
storage and handling standards, and restricts the museum from
using funds from a future deaccession of the painting for
operational costs.
This in turn may force museums to make difficult stewardship
decisions. Faced with the choice to make a potentially expensive
acquisition of a restricted gift or lose an important donation,
museums may be forced to reconsider the dynamics of
deaccession. Recent developments in the deaccession debate have
shown that institutions are more willing now than ever before to
consider their collections as assets and to view deaccession as a
viable tool for helping the institution remain relevant." 4 In light of
this, it is not entirely clear how museums would deploy
deaccession as they enter this new market of artist gifts. One
possibility is that if the types of restrictions artists put on their gifts
have significant infrastructure costs, 2 15 museums may be forced to
consider deaccession as a method of paying those costs. 2 6 This
reaffirms the collection-as-asset concept and could result in
accelerating the shift towards using deaccession proceeds for
operational expenses, a process that has been somewhat
controversial in the past.21 7
Another possibility is that museums will reexamine their criteria
for deaccession. Artist gifts necessarily come from living artists,
and thus would presumably be relatively newer works. Under an
incentive regime that forces new works into the public trust, it is
reasonable to expect that collector gifts would be comparatively
older pieces, as fewer new pieces enter the private marketplace,
and that collector gifts would generally be the older pieces in any
particular collection as collector giving drops and artist giving
increases. Many potential artist gifts would come with restrictions

214. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
215. For example, if the artist specifies provisions relating to storage and
upkeep.
216. Of course, the choice of what works to deaccession becomes
complicated if a great number of the other works in a collection are also
restricted. The possibility of changing deaccession criteria in order to make
more works available for deaccession is discussed infra Part IV.B.4.
217. See supra note 98-102 and accompanying text.
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on deaccession. Thus, if there were to develop a significant gap
between artist giving and collector giving, museums might tend to
favor older pieces donated from collectors for deaccession,
regardless of how the funds were to be used.2t 8
4. Impact
The picture that emerges from these hypotheticals is an
incentive structure that favors artists over collectors while
effecting a paradigm shift in development strategies for collecting
institutions.
Importantly, the collector-museum relationship
cannot serve as a model for this proposed artist-museum paradigm.
In order to achieve the partnership espoused in the title of the Act,
artists and museums will have to work closely together while
rigorously defending their own interests. Ideally, this will lead to
compromises that ultimately benefit artists, museums, and, most
importantly, the public. These compromises are perhaps best
expressed from the museum's point of view, though artists will
also need to advocate for their best interests. First, museums
should be open to separate donations of physical objects and
copyrights, but should insist on the eventual donation of both.
Further, museums should affirm their commitment to respecting
the artist's moral rights, even to the extent of contractually
expanding those rights, especially if this can be done in such a way
as to avoid other restrictions on use. Finally, museums should
reevaluate their deaccession policies with a mind to affirming a
specific, ethical, and realistic mechanism for developing their
collections, which may include reimagining what uses of
deaccession funds constitute this development.
There may be alternatives to the provisions of the Act that
would achieve the goals of the Act without putting artists and
museums in these precarious negotiations. The simplest is for
Congress to simply remove the provision that allows separately
alienable gifts of the same object. This is the provision that would
218. If the only donations coming into a collection are recent works by living
artists, and if those works come with restrictions on deaccession, then the
options a museum has as it develops its collection are limited. Taken to an
extreme, newer minor or redundant pieces may be favored over older pieces that
simply have no one to advocate for them.
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cause the most tension between artists and museums, in that it
makes any particular donation less appealing at the outset and
substantially lowers museums' bargaining power once negotiations
have commenced. Even some limitation to the artist's ability to
donate aspects of the same creation to different donees would be
more ideal than the potential difficulties artists and museums
might face under the proposed rules.
Along the same lines, Congress could expand or clarify the
moral rights regime. If Congress were to amend VARA at the
same time so as to make clear that it is not the exclusive remedy
for moral rights actions, or to apply it to a wider range of artists,
that would remove another element from the potential negotiations
between artists and museums.
Also, with no affirmative,
contractual duties related to moral rights, museums can rely on the
ethical standards that have guided their treatment of works of art in
the past and avoid the increased costs of accepting donations
imposed by those affirmative duties.
Alternatively, Congress could establish art donation arbitration
boards. The idea of such a body would be to facilitate responsible
artist donations by setting neutral artistic donation standards and
mediating between major artist donors and museum donees. Like
the Art Advisory Panel that reviews high value donations from
collectors, 19 an arbitration board would be available for any
donation meeting a certain valuation threshold designed to ensure
that both parties are on equal footing in situations in which the
potential deduction is high and the museum may be in a weak
bargaining position. This would reduce some of the costs of
negotiation and eliminate some of the difficulties related to the
disparate interests of artists and museums in those negotiations.
V. CONCLUSION

Since 1969, artists have not been able to take a fair market value
deduction for charitable donations of their own work, a situation
that has resulted in the overall demise of artist giving. Major
artists have tended to retain possession of their work or to sell their
work into private collections, potentially limiting public access to

219. Supra note 28.
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important cultural objects. Collectors, on the other hand, have
until recently received what some see as an unfairly favorable tax
treatment for the donation of these same works. With further
changes in the tax code, most recently the passage of the Pension
Protection Act, even these donations have dropped off,
exacerbating the problem of public access and creating a potential
crisis for collecting institutions.
The Artist-Museum Partnership Act proposes a solution to these
problems, but in doing so implicates a number of contentious
issues and could have a dramatic impact on the way in which
collecting institutions carry out their development plans.
Charitable gifts would be brought in line with copyright principles
that treat copyrights and physical manifestations of a work as
separate properties, allowing artists to make multiple valuable
donations of the same creation. Just as is the case with collectors
now, many of those donations would come with restrictions.
Some of those restrictions are likely to involve contractual
affirmations of the artist's moral rights in the form of expensive
assurances of the work's physical integrity. All of these factors
would force museums to make difficult funding decisions and may
require a fundamental change in the ethics of deaccession. In
short, this proposal creates an entirely new market of artist
donations with a different set of standards than the charitable
market in which the museum community participates under the
status quo. Museums would have to adapt their procedures, and
perhaps their principles, to compete in this new market. The result
would be a more fair tax standing for artists and more access to
cultural objects for the general public.
Sean Conley
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